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1. INTRODUCTION
Estate planners are constantly faced with creating particularized solutions for an
individual client. A problem quickly arises when a family has a member with a disabil-
ity. Long-term care nursing homes can easily become very expensive.' Disabled
persons on governmental assistance typically are only able to maintain a low standard
of living because the benefits only cover the bare essentials. 2 If a family member or
caretaker wants to provide more than just the bare essentials after he is gone, he
must plan his estate accordingly.3
Estate planners then need to ascertain a way to keep the disabled person on med-
ical assistance, or Medicaid,'4 or Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"),5 while still
maintaining the same or similar quality of life to which that person has become
* Prof. of Law and Director of the Disability Law Clinic, the Pennsylvania State University Dickinson
School of Law.
** J.D. Candidate, the Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law, Class of 2011.
1. See Buck Stinson, Genworth Financial 2007 Cost of Care Survey, Health Care Providers, Assisted Living
Facilities and Nursing Homes, Genworth Financial, March 31, 2007, available at http://longtermcare.
genworth.com/comweb/consumer/pdfs/long-term care/CostOf_CareSurvey.pdf (last visited November
27, 2010) (the estimated average annual cost for a nursing home private room in Pennsylvania in 2007 is
$74,806).
2. See Elizabeth J. Jameson & Stephen C. King, The Failure of the Federal Government to Care for Disabled
Children: A Critical Analysis of the Supplemental Security Income Program, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 309,
310 (1988); Andrea Hyatt, Legislation Allowing Disabled Beneficiaries to Collect SSI: Providing Disabled
Americans the American Dream of Comfort, 6 WIDENER J. Pus. L. 1, 2-3 (1996).
3. Carol Ann Mooney, Discretionary Trusts: An Estate Plan to Supplement Public Assistance for Disabled
Persons, 25 ARiz. L. REv. 939, 940 (1983).
4. 42 U.S.C. §1396 (2010).
5. 42 U.S.C. §1381 (2010).
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accustomed.6 Usually, a family member would like to bequeath money to a disabled
loved one to maintain or improve her quality of life, whether it be in a will, an inter
vivos gift, or a trust. However, Medicaid and SSI both have stringent resource (and
income) thresholds that could be implicated by any significant bequest.7 The result
is that an outright bequest or poorly drafted trust may cause the disabled individ-
ual to be removed from SSI and Medicaid benefits, and be forced to pay for, or
forgo, nursing care or health care.
A"resource"is defined as"cash or other liquid assets or any real or personal prop-
erty that an individual ... owns and could convert to cash to be used for his support
and maintenance. If the individual has the right, authority or power to liquidate the
property, or his share of the property, it is considered a
resource."8 Under Pennsylvania Department of Public Estate planners
Welfare (DPW) regulations, "available resources" are must take into
"[riesources that the family unit has or can use to meet
the cost of the services provided under [Medicaid]." 9
Few have the requisite assets to meet the cost of changing federal
nursing home and other services provided under Medi- and state programs
caid. Estate planners, though, have developed several
techniques to keep a disabled individual on govern- providing support
mental assistance while still receiving benefits from for persons with
family members who have died. Passing assets directly disabilities.
through a will or an inter vivos gift would not be a wise
option in this situation because those assets, being read-
ily available to the beneficiary, are an "available resource" for Medicaid purposes,
thus potentially disqualifying the disabled beneficiary from Medicaid eligibility.
The legislature and courts in Pennsylvania, however, have recognized special needs
trusts, or supplemental needs trusts, that, when executed carefully, can reduce the
costs to families, and provide additional resources for a disabled person in
Medicaid-funded nursing home care.
10
This article will highlight the three types of special needs trusts recognized in
Pennsylvania. They are the: 1) payback trust; 2) pooled trust; and 3) third party dis-
cretionary trust. N.B.There is also a fourth type of special needs trust, called a Miller
Trust, which is not recognized in Pennsylvania, and therefore beyond the parameters
of this paper.
This article begins with an introduction to trusts in section ra. Section III intro-
duces the Medicaid Act and the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993
(hereinafter"OBRA '93"). Section IV explains the evolution of the third party dis-
cretionary trust up until Lan 2 and its progeny. Section V explores how the courts
have analyzed third party discretionary trusts, sometimes referred to as "common
law discretionary trusts," since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Lang.
6. Id.
7. See 20 C.F.R. §416.1205(c) (2010); 55 PA. CODE §177.73 (2010).
8. 20 C.F.R. §416.1201(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
9. 55 PA. CODE §177.82 (2010).
10. Hyatt, supra note 2, at 4; See also Brent A. Mitchell, Medicaid Planning for the Elderly: Using
Supplemental Discretionary Trusts to Pay the Costs of Long-Term Care, 31 WASHBuRN Lj 80, 82-83 87 (1991)
(stating that"many families are using [estate] planning techniques to ease the accompanying [home care]
costs").
11. 42 U.S.C. §13 9 6 p (2010).
12. Lang v. Commonwealth, 528 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1987).
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Section VI introduces payback trusts as defined in OBRA '93, illuminating how
some courts have analyzed them, and highlighting their strengths and weaknesses.
Section VII does the same with pooled trusts. Section VIII introduces some other
possibilities that an estate planner may have to analyze when helping a client create
a particularized solution for supporting a disabled family member. Section IX con-
cludes by making suggestions as to which type of trust would generally be the best
to implement under various conditions, notwithstanding the government's valid
concerns about people wrongfully taking advantage of welfare programs and the
increasing possibility of insufficient funding for future disabled individuals.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Since feudal times in England, trusts have been used to manage property both
before and after death.' 3 In 1376, Parliament became enraged that lawyers would
use a trust (then called a"use") to avoid creditors, calling it a"spendthrift" device.14
In 1536, Parliament enacted the Statute of Uses supposedly as a response to the mis-
use of trusts, although this statute only applied to passive landholding uses and not
to active uses that would later become the modern form of trusts.15 Despite
Parliament's difficulty accepting some benefits of using a trust, one commentator
has stated that trusts have been extolled as the most "distinctive achievement of
English lawyers."16
Trusts use a form of bifurcated ownership in which the property of the settlor is
transferred to a trustee who manages it for the sole benefit of the beneficiary.'7
When the settlor transfers the property, the trustee acquires legal ownership, while
the beneficiary or beneficiaries retain an equitable interest.18
The four most common types of trusts are mandatory trusts,"pure"support trusts,
discretionary trusts, and spendthrift trusts.19 As the name implies, a mandatory
trust requires the trustee to distribute all trust income to the beneficiary.20 A
mandatory trust will generally preclude a beneficiary from Medicaid and SSI eligi-
bility because if the trust income is mandatory, then those assets are available to the
beneficiary and therefore includable as a resource. 21
A"pure"support trust, similarly, will generally preclude a beneficiary from Medicaid
eligibility. A support trust directs the trustee to only distribute as much income or
principal as necessary for the support and maintenance of the beneficiary. 2 The Social
Security Administration (SSA) naturally understands support and maintenance to
include food, clothing, and shelter, as defined below, and therefore a resource for
SSI asset guideline purposes.2
13. Avisheh Avini, The Origins of the Modern Trust Revisited, 70 TUL. L. REv. 1139 (1996).
14. See, e.g. AUSTIN WAKEMAN Scorr, ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 9, 10 (1960) (During this time,
there was enormous discontent in England among laborers, and the poll tax, renewed by the Parliament
of 1380, ignited revolt among peasants). See JOHN RICHARD GREEN, A SHORT HISTORY OFTHE ENGLISH PEOPLE
251 (1911) (Lawyers did not fare well at the hands of the peasants. In Blackheath, they killed every lawyer
they could lay their hands on, shouting"not till all these were killed would the land enjoy its old freedom
again." Id. at 252.
15. F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 23,34-39 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J.
Whittaker eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1984)).
16. Joseph A. Rosenberg, Supplemental Needs Trust for People with Disabilities: The Development of a Private
Trust in the Public Interest, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 91, 99 (2000) (quoting Maitland, supra note 15, at 7).
17. Maitland, supra note 15, at 44.
18. Id.
19. Mitchell, supra note 10, at 95.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §154 (1959).
23. 20 C.F.R. §416.1201.
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A discretionary trust, sometimes referred to as a "third party trust" or a "discre-
tionary special needs trust," in contrast to a mandatory trust, gives the trustee com-
plete freedom to decide the amount the trustee will distribute out of trust income
or assets.24 This type of trust should allow a disabled beneficiary to retain Medicaid
eligibility while still realizing certain trust income distributions. 5 A beneficiary
does not have an interest in a discretionary trust until the distribution of income or
principal. 26 SSA, therefore, does not include discretionary trust assets as a resource.
There is also a fourth type of trust called a spendthrift trust. A settlor would nor-
mally create this trust to prevent an irresponsible, indebted, or incapacitated bene-
ficiary from assigning or alienating her right to the income.27 A beneficiary can use
a spendthrift trust to avoid creditors, although there are exceptions for self-settled
spendthrift trusts to prevent an individual from avoiding a debt to a governmental
agency, a tort plaintiff, or a dependent child.28 A spendthrift trust, then, would not
be a viable option to retain Medicaid eligibility.
Before examining discretionary trusts and other types of trusts that may work for
a beneficiary to retain Medicaid eligibility, some information about the Medicaid
Act may be useful.
III. THE MEDICAID ACT AND OBRA '93 CREATE TWO
EXCEPTIONS TO SELF-SETTLED TRUSTS
Congress created the Medicaid program when it added Title XIX, the Medicaid
Act, to the Social Security Act to improve access to medical benefits.29 The Medicaid
Act provides for the appropriation of funds to states for medical assistance programs
that aid individuals who meet certain categorical, medical, and financial criteria.30
Although participation by states in the Medicaid program is entirely optional, states,
and their political subdivisions, which elect to receive federal government funding,
must comply with all requirements of the Medicaid Act.31 The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania participates in the Medicaid program.32
Among other medical services and items, Medicaid provides funding for long-
term care nursing facilities, inpatient and outpatient hospital care, clinical services,
psychiatric care, prescription drugs and medical devices.3 3
Disabled persons are a category covered by Medicaid if they meet the financial
criteria. 34 The financial criteria for Medicaid eligibility require that an applicant
have assets, including income and resources,3 5 below a certain threshold. Generally,
for disabled individuals in Pennsylvania, the maximum for countable resources for
Medicaid eligibility is $2,000.00.36 Similarly, a disabled individual is ineligible for
SSI if the individual's non-excludable assets exceed $2,000.00.37 In addition to the
24. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §155 (1959).
25. Mitchell, supra note 10, at 95.
26. Id.
27. Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 107.
28. Id. (citing William F. Fratcher, Scott on Trusts, 4th Ed. 157.4, at 210).
29. See 42 U.S.C. §1396a.
30. See 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§1396a(a)(1), (a)(8), 42 C.F.R. §430.10 (2010).
32. See Tristani v. Richman, 609 F.Supp. 2d 423 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
33. 42 U.S.C. §1396d.
34. See 42 U.S.C. §1396a(10), 1396d(a).
35. 42 U.S.C. §1382.
36. 55 Pa. Code §178.1. But See DeBone v. DPW, 929 A.2d 1219 (Pa. Cnwlth. 2007), discussed infra (the
maximum for countable resources for disabled individuals falling into the medically needy only medical
assistance category is $2,400.00). See id. at 1222.
37. 20 C.F.R. §416.1205(c) (2010).
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previously mentioned regulatory and DPW definitions of"resources," a resource is
something owned by the disabled individual and is"an includable resource" if it is
available for food, clothing, and shelter.38 SSA's Program Operations Manual fur-
ther articulates that a trust is a resource if "an individual owns the assets in the trust
and ... has the legal right to use the assets for food, clothing or shelter."39 The guide-
lines provide the exception, however, that"property held in trust [is not] a resource
[if the claimant's] access to the property is restricted."40
Prior to 1985, a Medicaid claimant could remove her own access to her property
in order to receive governmental benefits.41 Any income or assets above $2,000.00
could be placed in a self-settled trust, naming herself as the beneficiary, known as a
"Medicaid Qualifying Trust."42 The trustee of the irrevocable trust could be given
discretion to make distributions, thus allowing the grantor to preserve the trust
funds and obtain public benefits.43
In an apparent response to the perception that such trusts constituted an abuse
of the Medicaid program, Congress passed the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reduction Act of 1985 (hereinafter"COBRA '85").44 Under COBRA '85, the trust assets
were deemed an available resource for Medicaid purposes, and the beneficiaries
were disqualified from receiving governmental benefits. 45 However, COBRA '85
failed to close a loophole for self-settled trusts in which the trustee did not have
discretion in making distributions. If the mandatory distributions were made for
less than the Medicaid eligibility asset guidelines, the trust assets were not consid-
ered resources, and the grantor retained Medicaid benefits.46
In 1993, Congress again amended the Medicaid Act when President Clinton
signed into law OBRA '93.47 OBRA '93 prevented rich individuals from bequeathing
all of their assets to their heirs while remaining on Medicaid and burdening the
taxpayers. The new Medicaid rules essentially foreclosed the opportunity for indi-
viduals to shield their assets in trusts in order to be eligible for Medicaid benefits. 8
The elderly could no longer transfer their assets to their adult children or to
"Medicaid Qualifying Trusts" to establish eligibility for Medicaid benefits. Further,
it became impossible for disabled individuals to disclaim an inheritance to become
or remain eligible for Medicaid benefits.49 Because a third party discretionary trust
is not created using a disabled individual's assets, i.e. not a "self-settled trust," the
restrictive provisions of OBRA '9350 do not apply.
However, OBRA '93 does contain two exceptions to the transfer-of-assets rules
and general self-settled trust rules.51 Disabled individuals can retain Medicaid eli-
38. Hyatt, supra note 2, at 7 (quoting Richard J. Bergstrom, Special Need Trusts: Financial and Estate
Planning for the Disabled, 172 J. AccT. 52, 53 (1991)).
39. Id. at 8 (quoting Social Security Admin., Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Program Operations
Manual System, SI 01120.105 (Oct. 1981) [hereinafter "Program Operations Manual"], at A.2).
40. Id.
41. Jennifer Field, Special Needs Trusts: Providing for Disabled Children Without Sacrificing Public Benefits,
24 J. Juv. L. 79, 84-85 (2003-2004) (citing Daryl L. Gordon, Special Needs Trust, 15 QUINNIPAC PROB. L.J. 121,
124-125 (2000)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 125.
44. 42 U.S.C. §1396a(k) (2010).
45. Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., Self-Settled Trusts Following OBRA 1993, 23 CO. LAW. 1297, 1297 (June, 1994)
46. Id. at 1298.
47. 42 U.S.C. §l396p (2010).
48. 42 U.S.C. §1396p(c) (2010); 42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(3) (2010); Jacqueline D. Farinella, Come on in, the
Water's Fine: Opening up the Special Needs Pooled Trust to the Eligible Elderly Population, 14 ELDER L.J. 127, 128
(2006).
49. See id.
50. 42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(3).
51. 42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(4) (2010).
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gibility if the trust assets are placed in two types special needs trusts: 1) payback
trust 52 and 2) pooled trust.53 These two trusts, unlike the third party trust, are funded
by the disabled beneficiary, as opposed to a third party.
IV. THIRD PARTY DISCRETIONARY TRUSTS UP UNTIL LANG
Commonwealth Reimbursement
In 1924, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court tackled the issue of whether a trustee
was required to reimburse the Commonwealth for funds expended on behalf of a
"lunatic."54 The beneficiary, Walters, had been committed to a state a mental hospi-
tal.55 His mother, before she died, executed a trust, naming Walters' brother as
trustee, for his "comfortable support and maintenance."5 6 The Court labeled this
trust a spendthrift trust, although today it could be considered a support trust.57
Pursuant to the Act of June 1, 1915, P.L. 661, the Commonwealth demanded recovery
of funds expended for support of Walters.5 8 Although the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reasoned that the spendthrift trust made distributions of income and princi-
pal discretionary, the trust's intention was to secure Walters' comfort and support.59
Satisfying obligations incurred on his behalf, the Court concluded, was within the
testatrix's intention.6 0
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion fifteen years later
in In re Waits' Estate.61 The decedent received state old-age assistance payments. 62
When he died, the Commonwealth sought recovery of funds expended for his
care.63 The Court again concluded, this time pursuant to Section 15 of the Act of
1936, that the Commonwealth was entitled to reimbursement "out of the real and
personal property of any beneficiary" for assistance furnished under that Act.64 The
Court further reasoned that there is an implied obligation to repay the Common-
wealth, and that this obligation should constitute a claim upon the estate of a
deceased beneficiary.65 Additionally, the Court stated, in dicta, that governmental
assistance is a form of public charity; the legislature did not intend for individuals
who had sufficient property to sustain themselves by receiving state aid.66
Only two years later, the Court again faced the issue of Commonwealth reim-
bursement, this time with respect to the Act of June 9, 1939, in In re Reiver's Estate.67
A mother and three children were indigent and receiving public assistance-68 The
children's paternal grandfather died and relevantly bequeathed money to one of the
children (Charles), which was held in trust by the York Trust Company.69 After
52. 42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(4)(A) (2010).
53. 42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(4)(C) (2010).
54. Walters' Case, 123 A. 408 (Pa. 1924).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 409.
59. Id.
60. Id. However, the Court limited the Commonwealth's recovery to repayment of expenditures made
after the trust was established.
61. In re Waits' Estate, 7 A.2d 329 (Pa. 1939).
62. Id. at 330.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Waits' Estate, 7 A.2d at 330.
66. Id.
67. In re Reiver's Estate, 22 A.2d 655 (Pa. 1941).
68. Id. at 656.
69. Id.
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Charles reached the age of majority, the Commonwealth sought reimbursement
from the trust. Using the "implied obligation to repay" language from Waits, the
Court determined that when the Commonwealth has provided maintenance for an
indigent person, "and it subsequently appears that the beneficiary has an estate or
property of his own, the Commonwealth is entitled to recover from him the moneys
expended on his behalf."70
Since 1941, up until Lang, the Pennsylvania courts have continued to order reim-
bursement to the Commonwealth for funds expended on the beneficiary's behalf.7'
As recently as 1983, in Stoudt,72 the Pennsylvania courts have used the mindset in
Waits to reason that public assistance is a form of public charity and should be
avoided at all costs. 73 In Stoudt, the decedent created a support trust for her daugh-
ter who was also receiving public assistance while living in a nursing home.74 When
the nursing home learned of the trust and informed the county, DPW determined
that the daughter was no longer eligible for public assistance because the trust cor-
pus was an available resource.75
In agreement with DPW, the Commonwealth Court reasoned that the trustee had
an "obligation to carry out the purpose of the trust and to provide for her support,
rather than saving it all for the remaindermen and forcing her to resort to public wel-
fare."76 The court further determined that the "purpose of the medical assistance
program is to furnish care to those whose resources are insufficient to meet the
costs of necessary care."77
Settior's Intent
In 1889, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that,"f[in deeds, as in wills, the
intent of the grantor is to be taken as the cardinal rule for their construction, and...
it may now be regarded as settled, that even technical words of limitation, found in
an executed conveyance, may be so qualified by the context as to make them con-
form to the intention of the grantor."78 Thereafter, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
continually reaffirmed the proposition that if the testator's intent is not unlawful, it
must prevail.79 Furthermore, the testator's intention is the "pole star in the con-
struction of every will and that intention must be ascertained from the language and
scheme of his [entire] will [together with the surrounding facts and circumstances];
it is not what the Court thinks he might or would or should have said in the exist-
ing circumstances, or even what the Court thinks he meant to say, but what is the
meaning of his words."80
The problem, as shown above, is that the courts will construe "maintenance and
support" language in support or spendthrift trusts to require trustees to reimburse
70. Id. The Court rejected the argument that since the state's payments had been made to Charles'
mother, rather than Charles himself, Charles had no duty to repay the benefits received.
71. See, e.g., Goodell Estate, 59 Pa.D.&C. 2d 468 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
72. Stoudt v. Commonwealth, 464 A.2d 655 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983).
73. See id. at 666; Scott Gardner, Supplemental Needs Trusts: A Means to Conserve Family Assets and Provide
Increased Quality of Life for the Disabled Family Member, 32 DuQ. L. REv. 555, 561 (1994).
74. Stoudt, 464 A.2d at 665-666.
75. Stoudt, 464 A.2d at 666.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §1396).
78. Appeal of Woelpper, 17 A. 870 (Pa. 1889) (quoting Criswell v. Grumbling, 107 Pa. 408 (1885)).
79. In re Estate of Walton, 186 A.2d 32,35 (Pa. 1962) (citing In re Estate of Collins, 143 A.2d 45,47 (Pa. 1958)).
80. Walton, 186 A.2d at 35-36; Kelsey Estate, 143 A.2d 42, 44 (Pa. 1958); Saunders Estate, 143 A.2d 367, 368
(Pa. 1958); Sowers Estate, 119 A.2d 60,62-63 (Pa. 1956); Cannistra Estate, 121 A.2d 157, 159-160 (Pa. 1956); Britt
Estate, 87 A.2d 243, 244-245 (Pa. 1952); Mulert Estate, 61 A.2d 841, 842 (Pa. 1948); In re Sarver's Estate, 188 A.
141, 142 (Pa. 1936).
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the Commonwealth if there are at least some mandatory distributions available to
the beneficiary contained within the trust document.8 ' Although, in general, a court
will give significant weight to the intention of the testator, public policy prior to Lang
dictated that public assistance was a form of charity, which should only be used
when absolutely necessary, and the trust corpus should supplant public assistance
otherwise available to the beneficiary.
V. LANG AND ITS PROGENY
Finally, in 1987, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed over sixty years of pub-
lic policy to create the possibility for disabled beneficiaries to maintain or improve
their quality of life through trust assets while remaining on medical assistance. 82 In
Lang, the testator created a testamentary discretionary trust for the benefit of all of
his children, one of whom, William, was a mentally disabled adult institutionalized
in a state mental retardation center.83 The trustee was directed to pay the income of
the trust and had"complete discretion"to invade the principal for the beneficiary's
welfare, benefit, support, and maintenance.8 4 In fact, she "provided clothing, gifts
and pocket money for William from the trust income."85
The trust's use of the words "complete" and "welfare and benefit," in addition to
the usual "support and maintenance" language, suggested that it was the settlor's
intention to provide the trustee with broad discretion and to improve William's
quality of life beyond the minimum standard of living.86 The Lang Court recognized
that settlor's intent must be determined "from all the language within the four
corners of the trust instrument, the scheme of distribution and the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the instrument.8 7 In changing years of public policy to
the contrary, and rejecting the sentiment in Stoudt, the Court stated that,"[a] settlor
should not be required to either bankrupt his family or run the risk of leaving a
handicapped member destitute or in want because of vagaries in the requirements
for public assistance or in the level of funding for such assistance."8 8 It is not in a
beneficiary's best interest not to be "forced to resort to public welfare."89
In further discerning the settlor's intent for the trustee to consider public assis-
tance before distributing trust funds to the disabled beneficiary, the Court noted
several factors. First, the settlor chose to set up a discretionary support trust rather
than a mandatory trust or a "pure" support trust.90
Second, the Court reasoned that the testator chose to set up one trust for four chil-
dren, rather than creating four separate trusts. 91 The settlor gave the trustee broad
discretion to make distributions to the disabled beneficiary knowing that those dis-
81. See Stoudt, 464 A.2d at 666.
82. See Lang, 528 A.2d at 1344-1345.
83. Id. at 1337.
84. Id. at 1342.
85. Id. at 1340.
86. Id. at 1342-1343 (citing 2 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTs, §187 at 1502 (3d ed. 1967)) (modifiers such as
"absolute" or"unlimited"create an enlarged zone of discretion).The Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §187
comment j (1959), suggests that the use of modifiers such as"unlimited" or"absolute" dispenses with the
standard of reasonableness. As commentators have noted, however, courts have rarely implemented this
view and have instead held that trustees may not abuse the discretion granted them, however broadly
that grant has been expressed. See Frolik, Estate Planning for Parents of Mentally Disabled Children, 40
U.Prrr.L.REv. 305, 328 (1979).
87. Lang, 528 A.2d at 1342 (quoting Farmers Trust Co. v. Bashore, 445 A.2d 492, 494 (Pa. 1982)).
88. Id. at 1345.
90. Id. at 1343.
91. Id.
24 PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION QUARTERLY I January 2011
tributions may be at the expense of the remaining children's share. Any remaining
income that was not necessary for William's benefit would then be distributed
among the remaining children.92
Lastly, during his lifetime, the settlor accepted public assistance in the form of
partial subsidization for William's institutional care. The Court reasoned that the
settlor wanted William to continue to receive public assistance while supplement-
ing his income through the discretionary trust.93 Based on these factors, the Court
concluded that the trust assets were not an available resource for purposes of
Medicaid eligibility.94
In making its determination, the Court in Lang recognized that William had attained
the age of majority (18).95 Under the 1974 Amendments to the Mental Health Act,
his father no longer had a legal duty to support him as long as William was already
receiving benefits under the Act. 96 Although the Mental Health Act considers the
entire available income from a mentally disabled person's own income, except for
$60 per month for personal use,97 and therefore treats most trust assets as an avail-
able resource, the General Assembly has carved out an exception. 98 A restricted
trust account is not considered an available resource for a disabled individual. 99 The
client establishes the trust and it is legally restricted from invasion of the principal
amount for care and maintenance. Income only may be assessed from such trusts.100
In 1991, just four years after Lang, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was again faced,
in two cases decided concurrently, with determining whether a settlor intended that
the trustee take into account public assistance funds when deciding to give dis-
tributions to a disabled beneficiary, and thus not preclude that beneficiary from
medical assistance. 101 In Snyder, the testator executed a will in January of 1985 and
within its residuary clause, created a supplemental needs trust naming one of her
sons as trustee for the benefit of her other son, Jay, and her daughter, Ethel.102 Five
months after execution, Jay got into a car accident, which required him to be placed
in a nursing home.'0 3 Jay was receiving public assistance prior to his mother's death
in 1986.104 DPW decided to terminate Jay's medical assistance when it discovered
the trust assets. 105 DPW reasoned that the trust assets were resources available to
Jay, thereby making him ineligible to receive benefits.106
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, echoing Lang, reasoned that the settlor's inten-
tion was the primary factor, looking at the four corners of the trust document to
determine what the testator would have wanted under the circumstances. 107 The
Court analyzed the language of the trust document to locate how much discretion
the settlor gave the trustee to consider resources otherwise available from the Com-
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1343-1344.
94. Id. at 1342.
95. Lang, 528 A.2d at 1345.
96. Id. (see also 50 P.S. §4502 (2010)).
97. 55 PA. CODE §4310.7 (2010).
98. 55 PA. CODE §4310.12 (2010).
99. 55 PA. CODE §4310.12(2).
100. Id.
101. Snyder v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 598 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1991); Commonwealth Bank and
Trust Co. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 598 A.2d 1279 (Pa. 1991); Gardner, supra note 73, at 564.
102. Snyder, 598 A.2d at 1284.
103. Id. at 1285.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1285.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1285.
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monwealth, in making his decision to distribute trust income or principal. 108 The
Court further reasoned that because at the time of the testator's death, her son was
already receiving public benefits, and she failed to change anything in the will or
trust, she wanted her son to receive the supplementary benefits from the trust in
addition to public assistance.109 Therefore, the Court determined that the trust prin-
cipal was not an available resource for purposes of medical assistance eligibility
guidelines."10
Unlike the determination in Snyder, the Court concluded in Commonwealth Bank
& Trust that the trust assets were an available resource for purposes of medical
assistance/nursing home benefits.111 In Commonwealth Bank & Trust, the settlor exe-
cuted a testamentary trust to benefit his mother who was receiving public assistance
while living in a nursing home.112 The trust provided that the trustee pay the income
to the settlor's mother, and authorized the trustee to pay so much of the principal as
was necessary for her support and maintenance, taking into consideration "income
or principal" available to her from other sources.113
The Court, using similar factors to those stated in Lang, determined that the trust
assets were available resources, and thereby precluded the settlor's mother from
medical assistance.11 4 In distinguishing Lang, the Court reasoned that: 1) at the time
the settlor executed the will, there did exist a duty to take care of his mother; 2) "in-
come or principal available to her from other sources" does not specifically make
reference to public benefits, which are neither income nor principal; and 3) all trust
assets could be used by the settlor's mother without concern for the testator's other
heirs, who were not co-beneficiaries and thus did not have a present interest in the
trust assets. 115
Five years after Snyder and Commonwealth Bank & Trust, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, in Estate of Rosenberg, faced the question of whether a trustee had discretion
to preserve the principal of the trust for the benefit of the remaindermen rather
than to expend it for the sole life beneficiary.116 In Rosenberg, the testator executed a
will that left $157,000.00 outright to his widow and placed an additional $65,000.00
in a trust." 7 "The trustee was directed to pay the net income to the beneficiary quar-
terly, and was authorized, in his sole discretion, to use principal for the comfort,
welfare, and maintenance and support . . ." of the beneficiary." 8 After the widow's
death, the trust dictated that the remainder would pass to the then living issue of
the testator.119 Ten years after the testator died, his widow entered a nursing
home.120 Within five years, she had spent nearly all of her outright bequest on nurs-
ing care and then sought public assistance, despite having $55,000.00 left in the
trust.121 The Court, relying on Lang, Snyder, and Commonwealth Bank & Trust, deter-
mined that the trustee did not have discretion to preserve the trust assets, that the
108. Id. at 1286-1287.
109. Id. at 1287.
110. Id. The issue of trust income as a resource was not before the Court. Id. at 1285, n.3.
111. Commonwealth Bank and Trust, 598 A.2d at 1282.
112. Id. at 1279-1280.
113. Id. at 1280; Gardner, supra note 73, at 565.
114. Commonwealth Bank and Trust, 598 A.2d at 1282.
115. See id. at 1282.
116. Estate of Rosenberg v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 679 A.2d 767, 768 (Pa. 1996).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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assets were an available resource, and that the sole life beneficiary was ineligible for
medical assistance. 122 The settlor's widow had not received public assistance during
the testator's lifetime.123 The remaindermen of the trust were the testator's sons and
grandchildren who were recipients of many gifts during the testator's lifetime, as
well as an inter vivos support trust for their education.124
The Court reasoned that the testator's lifetime gifts to his sons and grandchildren
"would have reduced his concern that the sons and grandchildren receive any ben-
efits as remaindermen of the estate."125 Furthermore, the testator could have made
his grandchildren life beneficiaries to place the trust more squarely in the realm of
Lang and Snyder.126 Instead, the Court determined that it was the settlor's intent
"that the principal of the testamentary trust he established be available to his wife
for her medical expenses, and that he did not intend for her to rely on public assis-
tance for her health care after his death."' 27
Practically, for estate planning purposes, the Court's decision in Rosenberg exem-
plifies how strictly the courts will construe third party discretionary trusts. When
the testator created the trust in the 1980s, both he and his wife were healthy.128 He
bequeathed, in total, over $200,000.00 to his wife, presumably to enable her to main-
tain the quality of life to which she had become accustomed. Instead, neither he nor
his estate attorney planned for a worst case (although probable) scenario, i.e., that
his wife would not remain healthy forever.
As a result, when his wife became ill and entered a nursing home, she depleted
$150,000.00 within five years, and via the Court's decision, the rest would, for all in-
tents and purposes, be depleted over two years. Presumably, then, the widow would
need to apply for medical assistance, anyway. Her family would never realize the
benefit exceeding $200,000.00, and the testator would have failed in providing his
wife with a better quality of life after his passing. The Court stated, in dicta, that they
do not subscribe to the notion that receiving public assistance is the presumed goal
of estate planning.129 Improving the quality of life of a spouse or loved one with a
disability should be the presumed goal of estate planning. Note that if the grand-
children had been life beneficiaries, rather than remaindermen, the trust may not
have been an available resource for purposes of Medicaid.130 Additionally, there
might have been a different result had the trust not employed the"maintenance and
support" language.131
In 2000, in Shaak,132 the Court finally articulated the most important factors to be
analyzed when determining a settlor's intent, in addition to the actual language of
the trust. Shaak involved an inter vivos trust into which the settlor transferred own-
ership of her home. She reserved the right to live there while she remained able.
Thereafter the trustees were empowered to dispose of the home and hold the trust
estate for the primary benefit of the settlor. In their absolute discretion, the trustees
were to distribute to the settlor so much of the income or principal of the trust, as
they deemed "necessary or advisable for the maintenance, welfare, comfort and
122. Id.
123. Id. at 770.
124. Id. at 771.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 772.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Hyatt, supra note 2, at 37.
131. See Stoudt, 464 A.2d at 666.
132. Shaak v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 747 A.2d 883, 886 (Pa. 2000).
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happiness of the Settlor."13 3 The Court affirmed the denial of medical assistance
benefits on the ground that the beneficiary of a irrevocable trust had assets in excess
of the requisite asset guidelines.13 4 The Court enumerated two salient factors for
determining a settlor's intent: 1) whether the trust provided for one or more bene-
ficiaries; and 2) whether the beneficiary received public assistance during the sett-
lor's lifetime.13s In Shaak, the trust document stated that the trust estate is"for the
primary benefit of the Settlor" and allowed distribution of principal, without discre-
tion, for"the maintenance, welfare, comfort and happiness of the Settlor."' 3 6 Addi-
tionally, Mrs. Shaak was the sole beneficiary, and was not receiving public assis-
tance at the time the trust was created.'3 7 Therefore, the Court held, the trust corpus
was an available resource under 55 Pa. Code §178.4, the pertinent DPW regulation.1as
Since Shaak, Pennsylvania courts have used, in addition to the actual language of
the trust, those enumerated salient factors to discern the settlor's intent. In both
Estate of Taylorl39 and DeBone,140 for example, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
used the Shaak salient factor analysis to uphold the denial of applications for med-
ical assistance benefits.' 4 '
In Estate of Taylor, the Commonwealth Court considered an inter vivos trust that
had been created by Mr. and Mrs. Taylor. The trust provided that, inter alia: "During
Settlors' lifetimes, the net income and personalty shall be paid to Settlors (the initial ben-
eficiaries) and/or held in trust for settlors' maintenance and support." (emphasis
added).142 Several years after Mr. Taylor died, Mrs. Taylor was admitted to a nursing
home which filed an application for Medicaid nursing home benefits. At that time
the trust held assets slightly in excess of $100,000. DPW rejected the Medicaid appli-
cation, and the estate appealed to Commonwealth Court.
Commonwealth Court rejected the estate's argument that the term "personalty"
did not include all personal property held by the trust. Additionally, the court noted
that Ms. Taylor was the sole remaining beneficiary and was not receiving public assist-
ance at the time her husband created the trust.143 Therefore, her application for
medical assistance was properly denied.144
Similarly, in DeBone, Ms. DeBone was the sole life beneficiary of a trust with a bal-
ance of almost $150,000, and had not been receiving public assistance at the time the
trust was created.145 The court discerned that the trust was created in response to
federal estate tax concerns, rather than any intent to preserve the principal for the
beneficiary's children.146 Furthermore, the actual language of the trust document
stated that it was created for Ms. DeBone's benefit, and that the principal was to be
used for her "health, maintenance and support."147 Therefore, her application for
medical assistance was properly denied.148
133. Id. at 884.
134. Id. at 884.
135. Id. at 886.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 885-886.
139. Estate of Taylor v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 825 A.2d 763 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
140. DeBone, 929 A.2d at 1219
141. See Estate of Taylor, 825 A.2d at 766; DeBone, 929 A.2d at 1224.
142. Estate of Taylor, n.139 supra, at 765.
143. Id. at 766.
144. Id.
145. DeBone, 929 A.2d at 1224.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1221, 1224.
148. Id.
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Although there have been many results to the contrary, with careful estate plan-
ning, it is possible to improve or maintain a disabled loved one's quality of life after
a testator passes away. If a beneficiary already has a disability, then it appears to
be possible to create a non-support trust with the beneficiary still receiving medical
assistance. Under the salient factors analysis in Shaak, as long as a beneficiary is
receiving public assistance at the time the trust is created, and there is more than
one life beneficiary included in the trust, a court is likely to allow the beneficiary
of a non-support trust to continue to receive public benefits. However, a problem
quickly arises when, as in the case of Mrs. Rosenberg, the beneficiary is healthy
throughout the testator's lifetime, and only becomes sick after the testator dies.
Adequate estate planning will examine all possible contingencies and recognize
that individuals are not likely to remain healthy indefinitely. Giving the trustee broad
discretion and naming several life beneficiaries can mean the difference between
using trust assets to improve a disabled loved one's quality of life, or using those
funds to pay for medical care until they are depleted. And, with the ever-increasing
costs of nursing and health care, what had taken a lifetime to earn, may only pro-
vide the beneficiary with adequate care for a relatively short period of time.
The courts and the General Assembly, however, properly are concerned that
individuals with significant resources may take advantage of the Commonwealth's
limited resources. They are essentially concerned with the rich elderly, who can
afford medical care without public assistance, receiving governmental benefits just
to retain trust assets for bequests to heirs or to keep "excess assets"for themselves.
Most disabled persons, arguably, are like Mrs. Rosenberg, who did not receive a
large inheritance, merely enough to maintain some quality of life, and perhaps even
a sense of dignity in her later years. Medical Assistance only provides the bare essen-
tials. With careful estate planning, though, a testator can provide for added benefits
for a disabled loved one to give her an improved quality of life while she becomes
eligible for, or remains on, medical assistance.
VI. OBRA '93 PAYBACK TRUST
As stated above, Congress carved out two exceptions to the usual transfer-of-
assets rules and self-settled trust rules when it enacted OBRA '93, one of which,
sometimes referred to as a"self-funded special needs trust," is a payback trust.149 A
payback trust cannot only be made by a parent, guardian, or other third party, similar
to the common law discretionary trust, but it can also be effectuated by the disabled
individual herself.150 Congress carved out this exception because if a disabled minor
has received a personal injury or medical malpractice award, under the general
principles of OBRA '93, he would not be able to preserve the award in a supple-
mental needs trust and still remain on medical assistance.151 The award, then, would
not be of any value to the disabled minor as it would be used entirely to cover the
costs of medical care.
A payback trust, as the name implies, is a trust created from the funds of a dis-
abled beneficiary and requires payback, at death, to the state for medical assistance
benefits.152 During his lifetime, a disabled individual will be able to access the trust
corpus, with limitations, but after death, the remaining assets must return to the
149. 42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(4)(A).
150. See id.
151. See Field, supra note 41, at 86 (citing Gordon, supra note 41, at 126).
152. Id. at 87.
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state.153 Again, these trusts are usually created to hold the proceeds from personal
injury or medical malpractice settlements to allow the disabled beneficiary to con-
tinue to receive medical assistance. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure per-
mit the use of payback trusts to resolve civil litigation.lM
OBRA '93 imposes two requirements for a valid payback trust: 1) the trust must
be created irrevocably for the sole benefit of a disabled 5 5 beneficiary under the age
of sixty-five; and 2) the trust must be created by the beneficiary's parent, guardian,
or order of the court.15 6 Pennsylvania's Act 42 of 2005 (hereinafter "Act 42"),157 how-
ever, requires that before funding a payback trust, all liens and claims in favor of the
DPW "for repayment of cash and [m] edical [a] ssistance shall first be satisfied." 5 8
Furthermore, Act 42 requires payback trusts to only be funded with a beneficiary's
own money when "the beneficiary [has] special needs that will not be met without
the [t]rust."159 Moreover, any distribution from the trust must have a"reasonable re-
lationship to the needs of the beneficiary."' 60 The statutory language does not define
exactly which special needs are covered under the Act, nor does it provide any guid-
ance as to what constitutes a "reasonable relationship to the needs of the benefi-
ciary." OBRA '93 does not have a similar provision.161
Additionally, under the Pennsylvania Fraud and Abuse Control Act of 1980,162
DPW is authorized to recover medical assistance payments, either by commencing
an action against a third party and/or insurer, or intervening in a pending action by
a beneficiary.163 The Act also allows DPW to place a lien on the beneficiary's settle-
ment, regardless of whether the claim is brought by both the DPW and the benefi-
ciary,164 or just the beneficiary.165
In E.D.B. v. Clair,166 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, relying on the Fraud and
Abuse Control Act, held that DPW was entitled to reimbursement for medical assist-
ance paid prior to the beneficiary's reaching the age of majority.167 E.D.B. (here-
inafter "Emily") was born with severe mental and physical disabilities.'16 Negligence
on the part of Centre Community Hospital in State College was the proximate
cause. 169 The parties agreed to, and the trial court accepted, a settlement which
included placing the funds in a "special needs trust" (payback trust).170 DPW, pur-
suant to the Fraud and Abuse Control Act,171 sought reimbursement for monies
expended for Emily's care, totaling $56,517.81.172 The Court determined that the
DPW was authorized to seek reimbursement for medical assistance paid prior to
153. 42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(4)(A).
154. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 2039, 2064, and 2206.
155. 42 U.S.C. §1982c (a)(3) (2010).
156. Id.
157. 62 P.S. §1414 (2010).
158. 62 P.S. §1414(d).
159. 62 P.S. §1414(b)(2).
160. 62 P.S. §1414(b)(3)(ii).
161. See 42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(4).
162. 62 P.S. §1401 et seq.
163. 62 P.S. §1409(b)(1); Shaffer-Doan v. Commonwealth, 960 A.2d 500,506 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
164. 62 P.S. §1409(b)(7)(ii); Shaffer-Doan, 960 A.2d at 507-508.
165. 62 P.S. §1409(b)(7)(i); Shaffer-Doan, 960 A.2d at 507-508.
166. E.D.B. v. Clair, 987 A.2d 681 (Pa. 2009).
167. Id. at 691.
168. Id. at 682.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 682-683.
171. 62 P.S. §1409(b)(1).
172. E.D.B., 987 A.2d at 683.
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Emily's reaching the age of majority. 73 Although the Court apparently allowed the
payback trust, DPW received over $50,000.00 in settlement proceeds.174
An estate planner can create a payback trust if a disabled beneficiary under the
age of sixty-five recovers a personal injury or medical malpractice settlement. In
Pennsylvania, the laws appear to be strict, and DPW will seek reimbursement for
monies expended on the beneficiary's behalf. The Fraud and Abuse Control Act
even requires that if someone receiving public benefits initiates a cause of action for
personal injury or medical malpractice, he must give proper notice to DPW. 75
Additionally, both OBRA '93 and Act 42 fail to provide guidance as to what happens
after the disabled individual reaches the age of sixty-five.176 Do the trust assets then
become available for medical assistance asset purposes? 77 Are Act 42's stricter pro-
visions consistent with OBRA '93?178 Estate planners must keep these statutes in
mind when deciding the best course of action for a disabled individual and know
that, perhaps, a significant portion of any litigation proceeds may wind up in DPW's
hands.
VII. OBRA '93 POOLED TRUSTS
Congress also carved out a pooled trust exception in OBRA '93, also referred to as
a "special needs pooled trust,""master trust" or a "pay-to trust."179 In a pooled trust,
many different disabled individuals place assets in the trust, each in separate indi-
vidual accounts, in order to achieve efficiency.'80 By analogy, the pooled trust is like
a bank that holds the assets of individual account holders, or like a mutual fund in
which individuals invest funds into a common fund but everyone has his own indi-
vidual account.
The trust must be established and maintained by a non-profit association.' 8' In
Pennsylvania, there are several pooled trusts currently operating, including The
ARC Community Trust of Pennsylvania, Berks Community Trust, and The Achieva
Family Trust.182 As with a payback trust, an individual must be disabled under the
definition in 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3) in Title XVI of the Social Security Act.'83 Unlike
the payback trust, however, under OBRA '93, funds do not need to be paid back to
the Commonwealth when the disabled beneficiary dies, but resources remain in the
pooled trust for the benefit of the other disabled individuals in the trust.184 Any excess
assets, then, cannot be bequeathed to heirs, remaindermen, or life beneficiaries.
173. Id. at 691.
174. Id. at 682.
175. See 62 P.S. §1409(b)(5).
176. Field, supra note 41, at 88 (citing Wiesner, OBRA '93 and Medicaid: Asset Transfers, Trust Availability,
and Estate Recovery Statutory Analysis in Context, 47 WEST'S Soc. SEC. REP. Sivc. 757, 777 (May, 1995).
177. Id.
178. See Lewis v. Rendell, 501 F.Supp. 2d 671 (E.D. Pa. 2007). Although the court determined that the
plaintiff's substantive due process claims failed, id. at 688, the procedural due process claims survived in
part because the plaintiff had a property interest in Medicaid benefits. Id. at 691-692. The court further
reasoned that 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(3)and 62 P.S. §423 provided adequate procedural protections. Id. The
court also recognized a §1983 claim for rights violated under 42 U.S.C. §§1396p(d)(4),1396d(a), and 1396a
(a)(8), (10), and (18). Id. at 685.
179. 42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(4)(C) (2010).
180. Field, supra note 41, at 88 (citing A. Frank Johns, Legal Ethics Applied to Initial Client-Lawyer Engage-
ments in Which Lawyers Develop Special Needs Pooled Trusts, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 47,63 (2002).
181. 42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(4)(C)(i) (2010).
182. Jeffrey A. Marshall, A Pennsylvania Guide to Special Needs Trusts, 2009, available at http://www.
paelderlaw.com/pdf/special-needsbeneficiary.pdf (last visited November 29, 2010).
183. See 42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(4)
184. See 42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(4)(C).
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Act 42 imposes an additional limitation on pooled trusts. It requires that "upon
the death of the beneficiary or upon the earlier termination of the [tirust, the Depart-
ment ... must be reimbursed from the funds remaining in the [tirust"and that "no
more than fifty (50%) percent of the amount remaining in the beneficiary's [p]ooled
[tirust account may be retained by the [t]rust without any obligation to reimburse
the Department."'8 OBRA '93 does not contain a similar reimbursement provision.186
Despite this limitation, the pooled trust does have some advantages over the pay-
back trust. For example, fees may be lower since the trustee is a non-profit associa-
tion, there may be broader investment options, and the pooled trust is already
established, making it relatively easier to execute than a payback trust. Additionally,
it does not require a disabled beneficiary to be under the age of sixty-five.187 A dis-
abled beneficiary can, theoretically, enter a pooled trust after turning sixty-five and
receive its benefits regardless of age. One drawback for an estate planner to consider,
however, is that when the beneficiary dies or the trust is terminated, any remaining
assets cannot be bequeathed to any family member or loved one; they must remain
in the pooled trust for another disabled beneficiary's consumption. 8 8
Vill. OTHER POSSIBILITIES
Aside from the three types of trusts described above, OBRA '93, Act 42, and the
Pennsylvania Fraud and Abuse Control Act, have made it considerably difficult for
estate planners to ensure that disabled beneficiaries will be able to retain their
entire settlement or inheritance, without having to reimburse DPW for monies
expended on their behalf. With third party trusts, the difficulty was not to retain all
trust assets while remaining on medical assistance, but to remain on medical assist-
ance without having to pay for medical care out of trust assets.
One possibility to ensure medical assistance eligibility may be to disinherit the
disabled family member. An estate planner may be loathe to recommend this,
especially with children of a testator. To disinherit any child, especially a disabled
child, could have a deleterious effect on him. It might be difficult or impossible to
explain to the child that the rationale for his exclusion was based solely for him to
remain on medical assistance. 189 Also, the testator may not have another beneficiary
to which he wishes to leave his estate. There are enough judicial and legislative
solutions to make disinheritance a last resort.
Creating a so-called "Faith Trust" is another possibility. For example, where the
testator has two children, one of whom is disabled, the testator may disinherit the
disabled child but put precatory language in a will or trust that the non-disabled
child should help out with the disabled child financially. However, with precatory
language expressing a future intent, wish, or hope that the non-disabled child will
share assets with a disabled sibling, the disabled child obtains no enforceable rights
or guaranteed benefit.190 There would be a real risk of the beneficiary retaining all
assets, without providing anything to the disabled person.191 Additionally, the ben-
eficiary may predecease the disabled person and the remaining assets would be left
in the beneficiary's estate and be distributed accordingly.192
185. 62 P.S. §1414 (b)(3)(iii) (2010) (emphasis added).
186. 42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(4)(C).
187. See 42 U.S.C. §1396p(d)(4)(C).
188. Id.
189. Judith G. McMullen, Family Support of the Disabled: A Legislative Proposal to Create Incentives to
Support Disabled Family Members, 23 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 439, 453 (1990).
190. See, e.g., In re Bellas Estate, 34 A. 1003 (Pa. 1896).
191. McMullen, supra note 189, at 453.
192. Id. at 454.
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A possibility that an estate planner must consider in a relatively few cases is that
a disabled person might become healthy later in life. With a third party discre-
tionary trust, an estate planner can write provisions into the trust to account for that
contingency, by authorizing the trustee to distribute more trust assets to the once-
disabled beneficiary, under the condition that he is improved, and no longer requires
medical assistance.
Lastly, it is possible, as exemplified in Rosenberg, that a healthy individual can
become disabled later in life. With careful estate planning, Mrs. Rosenberg could
have received public benefits as well as trust assets if the settlor planned for that
possibility. If Mrs. Rosenberg, instead, received a settlement from a personal injury
or medical malpractice lawsuit, she could have set up a payback trust, or have
placed her assets in a pooled trust, in order to receive public benefits. An estate
planner would need to explain that under OBRA '93, Act 42, and the Pennsylvania
Fraud and Abuse Control Act, DPW may receive potentially significant portions of
her settlement.
IX. TRUST DISTRIBUTIONS
In making distributions to the beneficiary, the trustee needs to keep several
things in mind. As already noted, Act 42 provides that "any expenditure from the
trust must have a reasonable relationship to the needs of the beneficiary."193
Moreover, SSA has complex regulations on "how income affects SSI payments." 94
There are two important concepts. First, some benefits simply do not count as
income.195 Second, earned income and unearned income are treated differently.196
Income is generally defined as "anything you receive in cash or in kind that you
can use to meet your needs for food and shelter."197 Certain items the recipient may
receive are not counted as income. For example, a trustee could purchase a specially
equipped van for the recipient which would not count as income as long as it is the
recipient's only vehicle.' 98 A trustee could pay bills directly to the supplier on behalf
of a recipient, and those payments would not count as income. Only the value of the
goods would count and only to the extent that they come under the headings of food
and shelter.199 Thus a trustee could purchase a television set for the recipient and it
would not constitute income for SSI purposes.
To the extent that payment from a trust is counted as income, it will be"unearned
income."200 Certain unearned income is "disregarded" by SSA. SSA will disregard
gifts used for paying necessary educational expenses.201 Likewise, SSA will disre-
gard"the first $60 of unearned income received in a calendar quarter if you receive it
infrequently or irregularly."202 After"income disregards," there is a dollar for dollar
reduction in SSI for countable income.203
It is important to note that an eligible individual residing in a medical treatment
facility where a substantial part of the cost of care is paid by Medicaid will have her
193. 62 P.S. §1414(b)(3)(ii).
194. 20 C.F.R. §416.1100 et seq.
195. 20 C.F.R. §416.1103.
196. Compare 20 C.F.R. §§416.1110-1112 and 20 C.F.R. §§416.1120-1124.
197. 20 C.F.R. §416.1102.
198. 20 C.F.R. §416.1103(j).
199. 20 C.F.R. §4 16.1103(g).
200. 29 C.F.R. §§416.1120, 1121.
201. 20 C.F.R. §§416.1124(c)(3).
202. 20 C.F.R. §416.1124(c)(6).
203. 20 C.F.R. §416.420.
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SSI reduced to $30/month.204 In some circumstances, this reduction will not occur
until the recipient has been in the facility for two (2) full months. 205
Finally, trustees should be aware that there is one category of disabled adult chil-
dren whose Social Security benefits will not be affected by income or resources.
These are people receiving "childhood disability benefits" (CDB), formerly and more
accurately known as"disabled adult child"(DAC) benefits.The adult child of a deceased,
retired, or disabled wage earner, can receive monthly benefits on that parent's Social
Security account, if the child was dependent on that parent, is unmarried, and became
disabled before age 22.206 Because this is part of the Social Security insurance pro-
gram and not SSI, there is no financial means test for eligibility.
X. CONCLUSION
Trusts have been available since the 1300s, but only recently have the state and
federal legislatures and the court system made it possible for disabled individuals
to receive distributions from a trust while retaining medical assistance. Congress
and the General Assembly are legitimately concerned about the wealthy taking
advantage of taxpayer dollars, and the state not retaining enough funds for indigent
disabled persons who may need medical assistance. OBRA'93, Act 42, and the Penn-
sylvania Fraud and Abuse Control Act have been able to strike a balance between
allowing disabled beneficiaries to maintain or improve their quality of life and
imposing less of a burden on the taxpayer to ensure medical assistance for disabled
people. With these statutes in place, disabled beneficiaries can reimburse DPW for
monies expended on their behalf while remaining on medical assistance, and not
having to foot the bill of ever-increasing medical and nursing home costs.
Although estate planners can utilize a third party discretionary trust, payback
trust, or pooled trust to ensure a disabled beneficiary has a future on which to depend,
they still need to plan for every possible contingency that may occur. If a disabled
individual receives a personal injury or medical malpractice settlement, for exam-
ple, an estate planner should suggest either a payback or pooled trust, depending
on how much money would be placed in the trust, the age of the disabled benefi-
ciary, and who, or what entity, the client wants to be the trustee handling the trust
assets.
A third party discretionary trust should be used if a parent, guardian, or other
loved one is funding the trust. Especially since Lang, the Pennsylvania courts have
established a new public policy in support of these trusts, as long as the beneficiary
is on medical assistance before creation of the trust, there are multiple life benefi-
ciaries, and the language of the document permits the trustee complete discretion
of exactly how to distribute trust assets.
The truth is that no one can predict exactly what the future will bring. With care-
ful estate planning, however, and use of language in the trust document consistent
with the applicable statutes and case law, a disabled beneficiary can likely have an
improved quality of life even after the settlor's death.
204. 20 C.F.R. §416.414(b).
205. 20 C.F.R. §416.212.
206. 20 C.F.R. §404.350.
